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RETHINKING COMPLIANCE:
THE ROLE OF WHISTLEBLOWERS
ClaireSylvia and Emily Stabile*
Abstract
Among the more dubious conjectures in contemporarypolicy debates
about deterring corporatefraud is that whistleblower rewardprograms
undermine internal compliance programs. The suggestion is that the
prospect of a whistleblower reward discourages employees from
reportingfraud to their employers, inhibitingthe ability of employers to
timely address the problems. This conjecture has little basis in fact.
Research shows that most whistleblov ers report fraud internallyfirst,
typically turning to external sources only when internalcompliance has
failed. That whistleblowers do report internally should not be
surprisinggiven the pull of institutionalloyalty and the extraordinary
personaland financial costs of speaking out. Moreover, the conjecture
misapprehends the critical, overarching policy goals of whistleblower
reward programs: ferreting out, remedying, and deterring fraud, as
opposed to promotinginternalcompliance programsfor their own sake.
Judged by the appropriatepolicy goals, whistleblower rewardprograms
have proven extremely effective not only in addressingmisconduct, but
also in deterring future misconduct and encouragingmore and better
internal compliance programs. Whistleblower reward programs and
internal compliance programs are complements, not substitutes, in
promotingcompliance.

I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the enactment of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
provisions in 20101, a curious debate ignited: would a whistleblower
reward program undermine the expensive internal compliance programs
in which companies invested as whistleblowers bypassed internal
reporting for the prospect of a rich reward? 2 The debate placed
* Claire Sylvia is a partner and Emily Stabile is an associate with Phillips & Cohen LLP.
Phillips and Cohen LLP specializes in representing whistleblowers in False Claims Act cases, as well as
in the SEC, CFTC and IRS whistleblower programs. This article grows out of a presentation at the 28th
Annual Corporate Law Center Symposium, Rethinking Compliance, held at the University of Cincinnati
Law School, on March 13, 2015.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010).
2. Peter J. Henning, A GreaterIncentivefor Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMEs (May 26, 2011, 2:18
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/dealing-with-the-s-e-c-s-new-whistle-blowerprogram/?_r--; Legislative Proposals to Address the Negative Consequences of the Dodd-Frank
Whistleblower Provisions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on CapitalMikts. & Gov't Sponsored Enters.
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corporations in the ironic position of arguing that their compliance
programs should be protected from robust competition from
whistleblower programs, while whistleblower advocates argued that
market forces should determine which programs were superior. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ultimately adopted final
rules in 2011 that embodied a compromise-rewarding whistleblowers
who invoked internal compliance programs before reporting to the
government, but not requiring that a whistleblower do so as a condition
of eligibility for an award.3
To date, internal compliance programs are still alive and well despite
the existence of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.
Nevertheless, the argument that whistleblower programs undermine
internal compliance continues to be pressed in another context. Notably,
in 2013 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform
published a report entitled Fixing the False Claims Act, which argued
that the False Claims Act whistleblower reward program undermines
corporate compliance efforts.4 The report called for reduced damages
and penalties for corporations that meet certain compliance standardsdespite the dearth of evidence showing that compliance programs
actually prevent and reduce fraud.5 Notably, although the report called
for legislation to reward "gold plated" compliance programs, it did not
identify any reason why companies would be prevented from adopting
effective compliance programs or why avoiding False Claims Act suits
might not be sufficient incentive to do so.
This Article argues that internal compliance programs and
whistleblower reward programs are neither mutually exclusive nor
antagonistic. Part II outlines the recent development of the theory that
whistleblower programs undermine internal compliance efforts because
whistleblowers are more likely to report directly to the Government to
obtain a reward. Part III challenges that theory, noting the dearth of
evidence that whistleblower programs have undermined internal
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Scott Garrett, Chairman, Subcomm.
on Capital Mkts. & Gov't Sponsored Enters); Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Com., U.S. Chamber
Warns New SEC Whistleblower Rule Will Undermine Corporate Compliance Programs (May 25,
2011), https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-wams-new-sec-whistleblower-rule-wilundermine-corporate-compliance ("This rule will make it harder and slower to detect and stop corporate
fraud - by undermining the strong compliance systems set up under Sarbanes Oxley to ensure companies
take whistleblowers seriously. Armed with trial lawyers and new large financial incentives to bypass
these programs, whistleblowers will go straight to the SEC with allegations of wrongdoing and keep
companies in the dark.").
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-1.
THE

4. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, FIXING THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT:
CASE
FOR
COMPLIANCE-FOCUSED
REFORMS
(2013),

http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/l/FixingTheFCAPagesWeb.pdf.
5. Id. at 2-4.
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compliance programs and the substantial evidence that whistleblower
reward programs have generated more and better compliance programs.
Part IV discusses the substantial evidence that whistleblower reward
programs have resulted in more actual compliance than compliance

programs, which in comparison are not that effective at deterring and

reducing fraud.6 When evaluated against the appropriate policy goal of
deterring fraud, whistleblower programs and internal compliance efforts

are complements, not substitutes in promoting compliance.
II. ORIGINS OF THE THEORY THAT WHISTLEBLOWER REWARD PROGRAMS
UNDERMINE INTERNAL COMPLIANCE EFFORTS

A common refrain in recent years is that whistleblower reward
programs undermine the efficacy and purpose of internal compliance
programs.7 This refrain reached a crescendo in response to the SEC's
proposed rules on
implementing the whistleblower provisions of the
8
Dodd-Frank Act.

In 2010, in the wake of the Bernie Madoff scandal, where a
whistleblower repeatedly brought to the attention of the SEC concerns

about a Ponzi scheme but no enforcement action was taken, 9 Congress
adopted an SEC whistleblower reward program as part of the DoddFrank Act. The whistleblower provision authorized a person with
information about violations of securities laws to report them directly to
the SEC, which could then investigate the allegations or refer them to
another enforcement agency. If the information led to a successful

recovery of over $1 million for the SEC, the whistleblower would be
entitled to a reward. 10 Although generally fashioned after the successful
federal False Claims Act, which had returned millions to taxpayers and

6. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failureof Negotiated Governance, 81
WASH. U. L. Q. 487, 510, 513 (2003).
7. See, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, Will proposed SEC whistleblower rules prevent the undermining
of
corporate
compliance
programs?,
DLA
PIPER
(Nov.
9,
2010),
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2010/1 1;
Alice Hsu & Julie M. Kaufer, Whistleblowing-A Better Way to Separate Credible Tips?, METRO. CORP.
COUNSEL (July 1, 2010), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/14572/whistleblowing-better-wayseparate-credible-tips.
8. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010).
9. The scheme ultimately resulted in devastating losses to investors. Financial losses from the
Madoff investment scandal have been estimated at approximately $17 billion. Jordan Maglich, Madoff
Ponzi
Scheme,
Five
Years
Later, FORBES
(Dec.
9,
2013,
10:30
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/Jordanmaglich/201 3/12/09/madoff-ponzi-scheme-five-years-later.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (West 2010). Dodd-Frank created a similar program for the CFTC. 7
U.S.C. §§ 2, 5, 12a(5), 26, amended by Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, §748, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010).
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the government, 11 the SEC whistleblower provisions do not authorize a
whistleblower to initiate a lawsuit on the government's behalf.
The Dodd-Frank Act also authorized the SEC to adopt implementing
regulations for the whistleblower program, which the SEC did,
promulgating proposed regulations in November 2010.12 Among the
most contentious issues surrounding the proposed regulations was
whether to require whistleblowers to report internally to their companies
before reporting to the Government. The Dodd-Frank Act itself did not
require that whistleblowers report internally before reporting violations
to the Government, providing simply that "the Commission... shall pay
an award or awards to 1 or more whistleblowers who voluntarily
provided original information to the Commission that led to the
successful enforcement of the covered judicial or administrative
action."' 13
Consistent with that provision, the SEC proposed
implementing regulations for the law that, among other things, would
permit a person to receive a reward for reporting violations even if they
had not first relayed their concerns internally to their employer. 14
The SEC's proposed rule quickly generated a large volume of
comments from corporations arguing that the SEC should "[c]ondition
award eligibility on the use of an available internal reporting system"
because "[e]ffective compliance programs rely heavily on internal
reporting of potential violations of law and corporate policy to identify
instances of noncompliance."' 15 Commenters pressed the argument that
without such a requirement, whistleblowers would rush to report to the
Government to collect rich rewards, rather than report internally and6
allow the company to address problems more quickly and effectively.'
In addition, companies argued that they had invested significantly in
compliance programs following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley in
11. See, e.g., Geoffrey Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the
New WhistleblowerProvisions of the Dodd-FrankAct, 1 BYU L. REV. 73, 76 (2012).
12. Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the

Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934, SEC.
& EXCHANGE
COMM'N
(2010),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/34-63237.pdf,
Implementation of the Whistleblower
Provisions of Section 21Fof the Securities Exchanges Act of 1934, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1).
14. ProposedRules, supra note 12.
15. AMS. FOR LTD. GOV'T ET AL., COMMENT LETTER ON THE PROPOSED RULES FOR
IMPLEMENTING SECTION 21F OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 2-3 (Dec. 7, 2010),

https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-35.pdf.
16. Whistleblower Provisionsof the Dodd-FrankAct, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 486, 492, 494
(2012) (explaining that the Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower provisions encourage external reporting)
[hereinafter Whistleblower Provisions]; AMS. FOR LTD. GOV'T ET AL., supra note 15; see also, e.g.,
Allan Dinkoff, WElL, GOTSHAL, & MANGES LLP, CorporateCompliance ProgramsAfter Dodd-Frank
9-10
(2011),
http://www.weil.cor/-/media/files/pdfs/corporate-compliance_postdoddfrank aelc oct.pdf.
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2002 and that those investments would have been in vain if
whistleblowers were enticed to circumvent them. 17 The U.S. Chamber
of Commerce's Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness (Chamber
of Commerce) argued further that the interests of whistleblowers were
"adverse to those of the company and its shareholders. The company
and its shareholders have a strong interest in mitigating any future
penalties and reputational harm, while the whistleblower would benefit
financially from 'letting the problem grow."'" 8 One industry commenter
went so far as to make the dire warning that adopting a rule that required
internal compliance as a condition of obtaining a reward was "essential
to prevent companies from being barraged with meritless lawsuits"'19 and
necessary "if corporate compliance 2 programs are to remain effective
after implementation of these Rules. , 0
After several rounds of comments, the SEC ultimately rejected a
requirement of internal reporting and adopted a compromise that
rewards whistleblowers who report internally without imposing any
obligation to do so. 2 1 In implementing the whistleblower rules, the SEC
carefully considered both the advantages and disadvantages to internal
compliance programs that direct reporting posed and came to the
conclusion that whistleblowers are in the best position to balance the
effectiveness of their company's compliance program against the risks
of reporting externally.
Undeterred, the Chamber of Commerce subsequently lobbied
lawmakers to amend the Dodd-Frank statute itself to impose the
requirement of internal reporting. The proposed amendment would have
barred whistleblowers from receiving an award if they did not report
internally first, required whistleblowers to file a complaint to the SEC
within 180 days of reporting to the employer, changed the mandatory
award provision to a discretionary award regime, and barred
whistleblowers from reporting if their job duties included investigating
and remedying the wrongdoing. 22 The proposal was not adopted, and
17. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 75051, required companies
to put in place internal procedures designed to ensure accurate financial disclosure and to establish
procedures for internal reporting and compliance by employees. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m).
18. U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., COMMENT LETTER ON PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTING THE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS OF SECTION 21F OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 2 (Feb. 15,

2011), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-145.pdf.
19. AMS. FOR LTD. GOV'T ET AL., supranote 15, at 2.

20. Id. at 2-3.
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4) (participation in internal compliance system is a factor in
increasing the amount of the award); id § 240.21F-6(b)(3) (interference with internal compliance a
factor in decreasing amount of the award).
22. Whistleblower Improvement Act of 2011, H.R. 2483, 112th Cong. (2011); Andrew Joseph,
10,
2012),
GOV'T
EXEC.
(Jan.
Bill
Draws
Lobbying,
Whistleblower
(stating that
http://www.govexec.com oversight/2012/01/whistleblower-bill-draws-lobbying/35798/
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from the

III. WHISTLEBLOWERS OVERWHELMINGLY REPORT TO GOVERNMENT
AFTER INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS HAVE FAILED

The concerns raised in response to the SEC's proposed rules certainly
seemed alarming. Adopting a rule that undermined programs whose
stated intent is to help ensure compliance with the law surely would be
bad policy. So what is the evidence that whistleblower reward programs
have an adverse effect on internal compliance programs? Research
shows that, in practice, most whistleblowers do report internally before
taking their complaints to the Government. In 2011, the National
Business Ethics survey found that only 3% of first reports by
whistleblowers were made externally, with that percentage growing to
11% of reports made externally the second time whistleblowers
reported.23 In total, only 18% of whistleblowers reported misconduct
externally without bringing their concerns to corporate compliance.24
Another study conducted by the National Whistleblower Center found
that 89.7% of employees who eventually filed a whistleblower case
initially reported internally to supervisors or compliance personnel.25
The report concluded that "[t]he existence of a qui tam or whistleblower
rewards program has no negative impact whatsoever on the willingness
of employees to utilize internal corporate compliance programs or report
potential violations to their managers., 26 While whistleblowers are
under no obligation to report internally, it appears that most do so, at
27
least initially.
These statistics make intuitive sense given the complex realities
companies such as UPS, AT&T, as well as industry groups such as the Retail Industry Leaders
Association, backed the amendment).
23. ETHICS RES. CTR., INSIDE THE MIND OF A Whistleblower: A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE
2011
NATIONAL
BUSINESS
ETHICS
SURVEY
13
(2012),
http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/reportingFinal 0.pdf.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. See also NAT'L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., IMPACT OF QuI TAM LAWS ON INTERNAL
COMPLIANCE
(2010),
http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/documents/DoddFrank/nwcreporttosecfinal.pdf
27. See, e.g., SECS. & EXCHANGE COMM'N, SEC 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM
16-17
(2015),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2015.pdf (noting that 80% of the employee
whistleblowers who received an award under the SEC's program reported their concerns internally or
understood that the violations were known before they reported). While the extent to which broad
conclusions can be drawn from these studies was questioned, little countervailing evidence was
produced to show that internal compliance programs are successful at preventing fraud or that
whistleblowers do not use them.
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potential whistleblowers face. The premise underlying the conjecture
that whistleblowers will bypass internal compliance in favor of a
potential financial reward is that whistleblowers face a simple binary
choice: report internally so that the company can address the problem or
blow the whistle and reap a large financial award. Framed that way, the
concern that financial incentives might undermine internal efforts to
address misconduct seems plausible. But the choices a whistleblower
faces are far more complicated.
Reporting internally does not
necessarily mean a problem will be addressed. Moreover, many
employees may face adverse career consequences just for having
reported internally. Indeed, while some industry advocates were
arguing in the legislative arena that employees should be required to
report internally before going to the SEC so that companies could ensure
better compliance, in the judicial arena companies were arguing that a
person who reports internally and is fired before reporting to the SEC is
not protected by Dodd-Frank's anti-retaliation provisions. 28 Reports of
awards and career advancement for reporting misconduct by superiors
are rare.
Additionally, reporting to the Government to obtain an award is not
an obviously superior choice for most whistleblowers. As an initial
matter, the putative whistleblower may be unaware of this option. In the
initial stages of reporting corporate misconduct, a whistleblower may
not know that they have the option of obtaining an award. 29 When
discussing the 2009 amendments to the False Claims Act, Senator
Grassley, the primary sponsor of the 1986 amendments to the False
Claims Act, remarked:
[Whistleblowing] is exactly what a lot of people have
done without even knowing the false claims law
exists .... [E]verybody
assumes the
only reason
[whistleblowers] brought it up is because they knew:
Well, I can make a case out of this, and I can get a large
award for bringing this to people's attention. Most of the
whistleblowers whom I know about did not even know
about whistleblower protection laws, did not30 even know
about false claims laws until they got into it.
The fact that most whistleblowers report internally first in an attempt
to resolve issues through the company's channels likely reflects this

28. See, e.g., Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015) (deferring to SEC
interpretation and rejecting company's argument that a person needs to have reported to the SEC to be

protected by anti-retaliation provision); Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th
Cir. 2013) (adopting company's argument that person must report to the SEC to be protected by anti-

retaliation p.ovisions).
29. See Whistleblower Provisions, supra note 16.

30. 155 Cong. Rec. S4412 (2009) (statements of Sen. Grassley).
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informational imbalance.
Even if a whistleblower is aware of the option of reporting to the
Government with the potential for an award, a whistleblower has no
assurances that reporting would be financially rewarding, as a monetary
award is by no means guaranteed. Nor is there any guarantee that the
Government will address the problem once it is brought to its attention.
In addition to the speculative chances of recovery, the potential
downsides of whistleblowing are extremely costly and far more likely to
occur than a payout. Whistleblowers who report fraud are likely to
suffer punishment by their employers, either by demotion, unfair
discipline or treatment, or termination. The costs of employment
retaliation may also follow a whistleblower after they leave their
employer whether voluntarily or not. In many cases, whistleblowers are
blacklisted from an entire industry and may have to abandon their
chosen careers entirely.
Data on whistleblowers' employment bears out this grim outlook.
One study on corporate fraud found that 37% of whistleblowers
concealed their identity, "a clear sign that the expected reputational
costs exceed the expected reputational benefits." 31 Further data reveals
that whistleblowers had good reason to desire anonymity, as "in 82
percent of cases, the whistleblower was fired, quit under duress, or had
significantly altered responsibilities. In addition, many employee
whistleblowers report having to move to another industry and often to
another town to escape personal harassment., 32 Startlingly, that statistic
drew only on whistleblowers who had successfully recovered in their
cases.3 3 Another study of whistleblowers in the pharmaceutical industry
provided a more subjective analysis, finding that whistleblowers tended
to view their awards as small relative to the time and personal costs of
bringing a False Claims Act qui tam case.34 Whistleblowers may also

31. Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on CorporateFraud? 27-28 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 12882, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2882.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Whistle-Blowers' Experiences in Fraud Litigation against
PharmaceuticalCompanies, 362 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1832, 1834 (2010). That assessment is not
uncommon. For example, in a False Claims Act suit against his former employer, military contractor
Northrop Grumman, whistleblower James Holzrichter won $6.2 million, of which he ultimately kept
$2.3 million after the government's share, attorneys' fees, and taxes. However, the case took 16 years to
resolve, during which time he was shut out of work as an auditor due to being viewed as a "snitch," was
forced to work menial jobs to make ends meet, and at one point had to move his family into a homeless
shelter. When asked if whistleblowing was ultimately worth it, Holzrichter appeared doubtful, stating,
"I don't know if it was worth it. I have the money, but how can I give my children their childhood
back?" Ben Hallman, Whistleblowers Beware: Most Claims End in Disappointment, Despair,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.comi/2012/06/04/whistleblower-law-falseclaims-act-awards-james-holzrichter n1563783.html.
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face lawsuits over the disclosure of company information, even if that

information
is provided only to the government to report unlawful
35
conduct.

In addition to the financial risks to whistleblowers, the social costs of
reporting are high. Whistleblowers often lose their work community
once they report wrongdoing by their employer.36 Not only are

whistleblowers required to refrain from discussing an investigation with
their current or former colleagues, but investigations impose burdens on
those colleagues, who have to produce documents, attend depositions,
and address other fallout from an investigation. 37 Social norms against
"snitching" persist and whistleblowers trying to do the right thing may
find their actions cause them to be ostracized rather than applauded.
Faced with these options, most people would choose to do nothing.
In sum, there is little support for the notion that the choice of
reporting internally or invoking a whistleblower reward program is a
simple binary choice. Given the speculative nature of the award, the
more immediate threat of employment retaliation, the lengthy nature of
cases, and the personal costs whistleblowers endure, the speculative
prospect of potential financial gain is unlikely to be the deciding factor
for whistleblowers. Concerns that most whistleblowers will choose to
bypass effective internal compliance programs if they have the prospect
of a financial reward appear overblown.
Moreover, those whistleblowers who do bypass internal compliance
programs may have good reason to do so. Not only is retaliation a
serious risk, but if fraud permeates all levels of the corporate structure,
reporting internally may be futile. For example, in Kuhn v. Laporte
County Comprehensive Mental Health Council, the audit team for the
whistleblowers' employer was alleged to have been engaged in a
widespread fraudulent scheme. 38 The whistleblowers reported that the
35. See, e.g., Siebert v. Gene Security Network, Inc., No. 1l-cv-01987-JST, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 149145 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2013); United States ex rel. Rube v. Masimo Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d
1033 (C.D. Cal. 2012); U.S. ex rel. Cafasso v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047 (9th
Cir. 2011); United States ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2009).
36. See Kesselheim, supra note 34; see also Patricia A. Patrick, Be PreparedBefore You Blow
the Whistle: Protection Under State Whistle-blowing Laws, FRAUD MAGAZINE (Sept./Oct. 2010),
http://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=4294968656.
37. See Conducting Effective Workplace Investigations: Legal Requirements and Practical
Considerations, K&L GATES (Sept. 18, 2007), http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/a7a74ba9634c-444a-bala-48cb73ec0 1d6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8e09ab9O-8b03-4534-88584ad6b22lbefd/ConductingEffectiveWorkplace Investigations.pdf (explaining the need for companies
investigating whistleblower complaints to interview all potential witnesses and collect all potentially
relevant documents from witnesses); see also Bob Road & Kris Meade, Fox in the Hen House,
CROWELL & MORING LLP (2010), https://www.crowell.com/documents/lntemal-Investigations-ofWhistleblower-Complaints-and-Dealing-with-the-Whistleblower-Employee.pdf (same).
38. Kuhn v. LaPorte Cty. Comprehensive Mental Health Council, No. 3:06-CV-317 CAN, 2008
WL 4099883, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 4, 2008).
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company's audit team had supplied the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Office of the Inspector General (HHS OIG) with
documents that had been altered in an effort to mislead HHS OIG
auditors, "including substantive changes to progress notes, corrections
made to billing codes, and the forged signature of a former employee. 39
One of the whistleblowers reported directly to the U.S. Attorney's
Office.4 °
Upon learning of this, the company fired both
whistleblowers. 4 1 Given the nature of the allegations-that fraud
permeated an entire department of the company, as well as the
company's reaction-these whistleblowers appear to have been justified
in concluding that reporting internally, which involved alerting the
Board of Directors and the Medical Director, would have been fruitless.
A typical response to concerns that systemic fraud may justify
bypassing internal compliance is that systemic fraud is an unusual
situation, and fraud is more typically caused by "one bad actor" or rogue
employee unilaterally committing fraud on his or her own without
company knowledge or endorsement. This idea that fraud is carried out
42
by "one bad actor" results in a perception in the compliance industry
that compliance programs should focus on rooting out individuals acting
outside of company norms, as opposed to focusing on how to head off
company-wide misconduct.4 3
Although most of the discussion of the "one bad actor" theory focuses
on criminal prosecutions, the argument and its implications carry weight
in the civil context as well. "
Indeed, the same motives underlie
39.
40.
41.
42.
adherence
consulting
43.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
The compliance industry can be defined as those businesses that exist around ensuring
to legal regimes and limiting liability for businesses. This includes ethics and compliance
businesses, legal professionals, and even academics. See Krawiec, supranote 6, at 497.
See, e.g., Global Antitrust and FCPA Compliance: What can you do today to avoidproblems

tomorrow?,

ASS'N

OF

CORP.

COUNSEL

(Jan.

28,

2015),

http://webcasts.acc.com/handouts/1.28.15 LitWebcast Slides.pdf. (Slide 4 states "the standard for
corporate liability is becoming virtually strict liability; one bad actor can create liability for an entire
company"); Scott D. Michel, United States: The New Environment in Corporate Criminal and Tax
Enforcement A
New
Push Begins.... CAPLIN
&
DRYSDALE
(July
21,
2010),

http://www.mondaq.com/pdf/clients/105942.pdf (stating in slide 8 that "[t]he actions of one bad actor,
even actions that no system of internal control or compliance could ever have captured, can, in theory

cause the company to become a prosecution target itself") (emphasis in original); see also Thomas R.
Fox, The Rogue Employee Myth: Prevention and Detection in a FCPA Compliance Program,
TFOXLAW:
FCPA
COMPLIANCE
&
ETHICS
BLOG
(Dec.
3,
2013),

https://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2013/12/06/the-rogue-employee-myth-prevention-and-detection-in-afcpa-compliance-program/.
44. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, OfBad Apples and Bad Trees: Considering Fault-Based
Liability for the Complicit Corporation,44 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1343, 1345-47 (2007) (explaining the
genesis of the "one bad apple" defense and arguing that "the reality of corporate crime differs from
assumptions about the ultimate responsibility of individual bad apples.").
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criminal and civil wrongdoing. Corporate-level factors such as
[s]alary structures and bonus policies that emphasize
performance goals-rather than how the goal is
achieved-provide incentives to achieve company
objectives with no counter-weight for consideration of
ethical implications ... Generous salaries and awards of
stock options align the interests of executives and
shareholders and encourage aggressive tactics designed
to increase the value of the company's stock.4 5
Instead of taking a broader view of the corporate culture and
challenging widespread corporate practices effectively, the "one bad
actor" approach leads compliance programs to focus on identifying the
"rogue" employee.
Upon becoming the subject of government
investigation, a company may concentrate on trying to cast a certain
employee as the bad actor, in order to pin responsibility on one
individual instead of the company.46
Another common explanation for internal compliance failures is that,
while most actors are trying to do the right thing, the regulatory
landscape has become too complex to navigate, making it impossible for
companies to fully comply even if they wanted to do soi7 This
argument tends to ignore the fact that the largest and most harmful
frauds, like the Madoff, Enron, and Cendant scandals, were not the
result of confusion over complex regulations. These frauds were the
work of executives, departments, and entire companies that created a
corporate culture that perpetuated fraud. For example, in the case of
Cendant, executives led by CEO Walter Forbes undertook a multi-year
scheme to deliberately inflate the company's value by falsifying $500

45. Id. at 1349.
46. Id. at 1346; see also Krawiec, supranote 6, at 502-03 ("[Intemal compliance structures may
be a useful device for demonstrating the organization's attempts to comply with legal rules, thus
painting the firm as the victim-as opposed to the perpetrator-of misconduct. This scapegoating
defense has been especially common, though not always successful, in connection with various 'rogue
trading' scandals."); see, e.g., Dean Starkman, Pollution Case Highlights Trend to Let Employees Take
the Rap, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 1997), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB876350099854168000.
47. See,

e.g.,

Corporate

Compliance

Basics,

WOLTERS

KLUWER,

https://ct.wolterskluwer.com/resources/guide/corporate-compliance-basics (last visited June 14, 2015)
("Today's regulatory landscape is more and more complex, as state and local governments expand
compliance requirements, increase fees and increase enforcement efforts. Even the most dedicated and
conscientious business can find it overwhelming to keep up with the constant onslaught of new and
changing requirements."); Over-regulated America, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 18, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21547789 ("But Dodd-Frank is far too complex, and becoming more
so ... financial firms in America must prepare to comply with a law that is partly unintelligible and
partly unknowable ... Sarbanes-Oxley, a law aimed at preventing Enron-style frauds, has made it so
difficult to list shares on an American stockmarket that firms increasingly look elsewhere or stay
private.").
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million in revenue.48 As the CEO who succeeded Forbes stated of the
scandal, "[t]he investigation has identified how a group of people at
CUC deliberately deceived and misled investors and business partnersand reveals a corporate culture that encouraged this behavior." 49 Walter
Forbes was eventually convicted of falsifying reports to the SEC and
sentenced to jail for his role in the scandal. 50 Bernard Madoff was also
convicted of fraud and sentenced to prison. 51
These frauds were not the result of regulations being too complex or
the result of business actors attempting to do the right thing. The
perpetrators were often acting in concert with others, highly placed
within the companies, and were aware of the illegal nature of their
actions, as evidenced in part by their efforts to conceal them. Although
some corporate mistakes are surely made in trying to navigate the
intricate interplay of governing laws, violations of the laws enforced
through whistleblower reward programs typically require a level of
intent beyond mere negligence.
Like the scapegoating of individual
"rogue" employees, casting compliance problems in this light places the
blame on external forces instead of addressing systemic failures within
companies.
IV.EVIDENCE

SUGGESTS THAT WHISTLEBLOWER REWARD PROGRAMS

ENCOURAGE COMPLIANCE

Far from undermining compliance, whistleblower reward programs
encourage and help achieve compliance with the law, but in a different
way than internal compliance programs.
Whistleblower reward
programs encourage compliance through deterrence, by increasing the
likelihood that violations will be detected and thereby increasing the
cost of committing them.
Congress recognized the deterrent value of whistleblowers when it
amended the False Claims Act in 1986 and when it shaped the
whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. In discussing the
1986 amendments to the False Claims Act, Senator Grassley explained
48. Cendant
Closes
Fraud
Case,
CNN
MONEY
(Aug.
27,
1998),
http://money.cnn.com/1998/O8/27/companies/cendant-folo/.
49. Id.
50. Stacey Stowe, Chairman of Cendant is Convicted of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/01/business/worldbusiness/01 iht-cendant.3356074.html?r-=0.
51. U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., UNITED STATES V. BERNARD MADOFF AND RELATED CASES,

http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/programs/victim-witness-services/united-states-v-bernard-l-madoffand-related-cases (last visited June 14, 2016).
52. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (defining "knowingly" under the False Claims Act); Dura
Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2004) (holding that securities fraud requires "scienter,
i.e., a wrongful state of mind.").
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that "the Committee feels that the active enforcement of this statute will
not only result in recovery of losses resulting from fraud, but that it will
also serve as a deterrent to those who otherwise might consider
defrauding the Government." 53 When Congress amended the False
Claims Act again in 2009, Senator Leahy explained that "[t]he only way
you are going to stop [fraud] is to show you are going to stop it. The
only way you are going to deter it is if you act to deter it, if you
investigate the people, if you go after them, if you make them pay, and
if we recover money for American taxpayers. 54 Although quantifying
the deterrent value of the law is an imprecise science, the General
Accounting Office estimated that from551986 to 1998, the False Claims
Act deterred over $300 billion in fraud.
Deterrence was a strong motive for passing the whistleblower
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act as well. In implementing the
provisions, the SEC explained that they expected the final rule to lead to
"earlier detection of violations and increased deterrence of potential
56
future violations."
The SEC also viewed the whistleblower program as an important
component of increasing compliance. The agency explained that
allowing direct reporting to government enforcers would allow
"whistleblowers [to] balance the potential increase in the probability and
magnitude of an award by participating in an effective internal
compliance mechanism against the particular risks that may result from
doing so." 57
The SEC recognized that whistleblowers could
complement internal compliance efforts, as "issuers who previously may
have underinvested in internal compliance programs may respond to our
[whistleblower] rules by making improvements in corporate governance
generally, 58
and strengthening their internal compliance programs in
particular."
The impact that the whistleblower provisions of the False Claims Act
and other enforcement efforts have had on compliance efforts and
deterrence can be assessed by looking at industries that have historically
53. H.R. REP. No. 99-660, at 18 (1986). See also id. at 63 (former Assistant Attorney General
John R. Bolton also remarked on the great deterrent power of the False Claims Act, stating that "[t]he
civil fraud remedies contained in the False Claims Act are an essential element in our efforts to prevent
fraud... [T]he aggressive use of our civil remedies is a significant deterrent as well as an aid to making
the government whole for losses to fraudulent claims.").
54. 155 Cong. Rec. S4410 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
55. Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam Fortune: Do Military Service Members Have
Standingto File Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act?, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 45, 47 (2004).
56. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 21F OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 238, Release No. 34-64545 (May 25, 2011),

https://www.sec.gov/rules/finaV2011/34-64545.pdf (footnotes and citations omitted).
57. Id. at 237.
58. Id. at 239.
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suffered from high levels of misconduct. The defense, pharmaceutical,
and securities industries each provide a window into how whistleblower
reward programs have shaped deterrence, prosecution, and industry
compliance efforts.
A. The Defense Industry
The defense industry has a long history with fraud, stemming from
the original passage of the False Claims Act (Act). The Act was passed
in 1863 as a response to rampant military contracting fraud during the
Civil War. 59 The law was used, albeit infrequently, until World War II
when amendments rendered it largely ineffective. 60 However, by the
1980s fraud had "grown to previously unimaginable proportions. 6 1
During this time, the Department of Defense suffered from a number of
high-profile procurement scandals including paying $1,118 for a 26-cent
stool cap; $38 for a 38-cent screw; and $640 for a toilet seat. 62 By 1984,
the Department of Defense had 2,311 active fraud investigations-a
30% increase from two years prior. 63 In 1985, Joseph Sherick, then
Defense Department Inspector General, testified that 45 of the 100
largest defense contractors, including 9 of the top 10, were being
investigated for fraud.64 The Department of Defense estimated that, at
that time, it was likely losing somewhere between $1 to $10 billion a
year to fraud.65
Spurred by the immense level of defense contracting fraud, Congress
felt that "the growing pervasiveness of fraud necessitated modernization
of the Government's primary litigation tool for combating fraud.", 66 In
response, Congress amended and modernized the False Claims Act in
1986, making it more effective. 67
In the years following the
amendments, the percentage of recoveries involving defense contracting
rose, and from 1987-1995 generally formed the largest percentage of
total False Claims Act recoveries per year. 68 Since then, the numbers of
59. The False Claims Act: A Primer, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 22, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDSFCAPrimer.pdf.
60. CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT § 2:8

(West 2d ed., 2010).
61. Id. at § 2:9.
62. Michael S. McGarry, Winning the War on ProcurementFraud. Victory at What Price?, 26
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 249, 253-54 (1993).
63. Id.
64. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5268.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1.
67. SYLVIA, supranote 60, at § 2:9.
68. William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits As Monitoring Devices in Government
Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1802 (1996) (see Table 2 for the percentage of defense
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defense contracting cases have fallen as a percentage of total False
Claims cases filed. 9 Although federal spending in military procurement
declined throughout the mid to late 1990s, it rose again sharply
throughout the 2000s. 70 Despite this, the percentage of whistleblower
cases involving defense procurement fraud continues to dwindle, 71 but it
is unclear if this is due to a decline in actual fraud.72
What is clear is that the Act, along with other developments spurred
the defense industry to significantly increase its compliance efforts. In
fact, the rise of the compliance industry stemmed from the defense
contracting scandals of the 1980s. 73 In response to the scandals, a large
group of contractors created a defense contracting ethics code, the
Defense Industry Initiative, and began hiring compliance officers.7 4
Around the same time, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations were passed, imposing criminal sentencing, penalties, and
fines on organizations committing federal crimes.7 5 Because the
Guidelines offered leniency for organizations with compliance
programs, this stimulated further formalization of the emerging
compliance industry.76
Despite the proliferation of compliance programs and efforts,
however, the defense industry continues to be a source of fraud.
Whistleblowers continue to bring to light numerous violations by
defense contractors, which internal compliance has failed to address. In
been the subject of repeated False Claims
fact, the same entities have
77
Act cases and recoveries.
B. The HealthcareIndustry
The healthcare industry, and in particular the pharmaceutical industry,
provides a more recent look at how whistleblowers have affected fraud
prevention, recovery, and compliance efforts. As Government takes a
recoveries from 1987-1995).
69. Mark R. Troy et al., Procurement Fraudand False Claims Act Developments, CROWELL &
MORING LLP (May 25-26, 2011), http://www.crowell.com/files/2011-Procurement-Fraud-and-FalseClaims-Act-Developments.pdf.
70. U.S. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Fiscal Year 2013 Historical Tables (2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy20l 3/assets/hist.pdf
71. Troy et al., supra note 69.
72. SYLVIA, supranote 60, at § 2:14.
73. Krawiec, supra note 6, at 497.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 497-98.
76. Id. at 498.
77. See Hall of Shame: An Index of Repeat FCA Offenders, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC.
FUND, www.TAF.org/paying-it-forward (noting companies subject to multiple False Claims Act suits)
(last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
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more active role in providing health coverage and pours more money
into the healthcare industry, greater opportunities for fraud abound. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation estimates that between three to ten
percent of all healthcare expenditures are fraudulent.7 8 Most healthcare
frauds-approximately 41%, by one study-are discovered by

employees, underscoring how crucial whistleblowers are to uncovering
fraud. In comparison, employees' whistleblowing in other industries
accounts for only around 14% of fraud cases. 80 The upward trend in the
volume of healthcare fraud and recoveries began in the mid-1990s and

continued throughout the 2000s, likely driven in part by growing
healthcare spending by the government. 81 A $430 million settlement of
off-label marketing allegations against Warner-Lambert in 2004 marked
the beginning of a spate of such off-label marketing fraud recoveries
over the next decade and beyond.82 On the surface, it appears that the
pursuit of healthcare fraud cases has had a deterrent effect on fraud in
this industry, as "[m]ajor settlements with large recoveries
have a ripple
83
effect that reduces the likelihood of similar fraud.,
One positive trend suggesting whistleblowers are effective in
reducing healthcare fraud is the inverse correlation between the
84

Medicare error rate and an increase in False Claims Act enforcement.

The Medicare error rate corresponds to the percentage of total Medicare
fee-for-service spending caused by fraud, waste, and abuse. 85 Although

the error rate includes technical billing mistakes as well as fraud,
86
generally a downward trend in the rate indicates a decrease in fraud.
78. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Middle District of L.A., Medicare Fraud Strike Force
Charges 107 Individuals for Approximately $452 million in False Billing (May 2, 2012),
http://www.fbi.gov/neworleans/press-releases/2012/medicare-fraud-strike-force-charges-1 07individuals-for-approximately-452-million-in-false-billing.
79. Dyck et al., supranote 31, at 3.
80. Id.
81. JACK A. MEYER & STEPHANIE E. ANTHONY, REDUCING HEALTH CARE FRAUD: AN

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD 9, 16 (2001).
82. Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability
Relating to
Off-Label
Promotion, U.S.
DEP'T
OF
JUST.
(May
13,
2004),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ 322.htm; see, e.g., Serono to Pay $704 Million
for the Illegal Marketing of AIDs Drug, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (Oct. 17, 2005),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/October/05_civ_545.html; Michael J. Sullivan, Schering to
Pay $435 Millionfor the Improper Marketingof Drugs and MedicaidFraud, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (Aug.
29, 2006) http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-mallegacy/2012/16/09/press%20release.pdf;
Andrew Pollack, Drug Maker Stops Work on Lung Disease Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/06/business/06drug.html?_r=0.
83. Jack A. Meyer, FightingMedicare& MedicaidFraud: The Return on Investmentfrom False
Claims Act Partnerships,TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND (2013), http://www.taf.org/TAFROI-report-October-2013.pdf.
84. MEYER & ANTHONY, supra note 81, at 21-24.
85. Id.
86. Id. ("Downward trends in the error rate reflect the success of a number of government policy
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Between 1996 and 2000, the error rate fell from 14% to 6.9%-meaning
that the dollar amount lost to fraud every year plummeted from
approximately $23.2 billion in 1996 to around $11.9 billion in 2000.87
This downward trend in the error rate inversely correlates roughly with
the rising number of whistleblower health care cases, which rose from
15% of total whistleblower cases filed in 1992 to 61% in 1998.88 By
2000, two-thirds of all False Claims Act cases involved healthcare
spending. 89 The Congressional Budget Office has stated that the
decrease in the rate of growth of Medicare spending during the same
time period could mostly be credited to greater government enforcement
and compliance efforts, including90both False Claims Act prosecutions
and their larger deterrence effects.
Increased prosecution of healthcare fraud has also motivated greater
compliance efforts including the widespread adoption of compliance
programs. Department of Justice officials noted that "the period since
the 1986 amendments to the FCA has seen a tremendous push by
industries doing business with the government to adopt effective
compliance programs and to prioritize corporate ethics." 9 1 As a result of
the surge in whistleblower cases against the pharmaceutical industry, the
industry group Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA) adopted the PhRMA Code on Interactions with Healthcare
Professionals (Code) in July 2002.92 The Code guides pharmaceutical
companies on how to prevent and avoid False Claims and AntiKickback Act violations, and HHS OIG has stated that compliance with
the code will "substantially reduce the risk of fraud and abuse and help
demonstrate a good faith effort to comply with the applicable federal
health care program requirements." 93 Initially, fifteen of the US's
largest pharmaceutical companies endorsed the Code. 94 The Code was

initiatives, including FCA enforcement. These trends are also driven: by enforcement of anti-fraud
provisions in HIPAA and the BBA, as well as improvements in Management Information Systems and
cost reporting review systems.").
87. Id.at41.
88. Id. at 38.
89. Elizabeth Wang, Trends in Qui Tam False Claims Cases, LAw360 (July 26, 2011, 1:56 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/258434/trends-in-qui-tam-false-claims-cases.
90. MEYER & ANTHONY, supra note 81, at 42.
91. Stuart Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Remarks at American Bar Association's 10th
National Institute on the Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement, Washington, D.C. (June 5,
2014), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/civil/speeches/2014/civ-speech-140605.html.
92. Mark S. Davis, The Effects of False Claims Act Whistleblowers on the Pharmaceutical
Industry (May 2006) (unpublished paper for the Harvard Law School Food & Drug Law Course),
http://nrs.harvard.edu/um-3:HUL.InstRepos:8965590.
93. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731,
23,737 (May 5, 2003).
94. Davis, supra note 92, at 40.
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95
updated in 2009 and now has over fifty signatory companies.
Another effect of increased enforcement has been increased
transparency, which, in turn, has its own compliance effects. For
example, the Affordable Care Act includes a provision that requires
manufacturers of drugs, medical devices, and biologicals that participate
in federal health care programs to report certain payments to physicians
and teaching hospitals. 96 Although such payments are not necessarily
prohibited, the requirement to report them may lead some providers
to
97
avoid conduct they would have engaged in if not in the public eye.
The whistleblower reward programs also serve an important role in
shining a spotlight on the failures of internal compliance programs. For
example, although the Code successfully secured endorsement from
most major pharmaceutical companies, these same companies have had
significant compliance issues since signing onto the Code.9 8 Of the
thirteen companies represented by the initial members of the executive
committee that endorsed the PhRMA code in 2002, all but two have
subsequently settled fraud suits concerning conduct that occurred after
implementation of the Code. 99 In addition, many pharmaceutical and

95. PhRMA Code on Interactions with HealthcareProfessionals:Signatory Companies, PHARM.
RES.
&
MFGS.
of
AM.
(Nov.
12,
2014),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/SignatoryCompaniesCodeonlnteractionswithHealthcarePro
fessionals.pdf. The Medical Device Industry followed suit with its own set of guidelines. See Code of
Ethics on Interactions with HealthcareProfessionals, THE ADVANCED MED. TECH. ASS'N (rev. 2009),
http://advamed.org/res.download/112.
96. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OPEN PAYMENTS, cms.gov/openpayments

(last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
97. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE OPEN
PAYMENTS
PROGRAM
FOR
FISCAL
YEAR
2014,
at
3
(Apr.
2015)
http://cms.gov/OpenPayments/Downloads/Open-Payments-April-2015-Report-to-Congress.pdf.
98. The failure of the PhRMA code is consistent with the lack of data supporting the efficacy of
ethics codes as a means to deter and prevent unlawful activity. See KYrawiec, supranote 6, at 511.
99. See Pfizer to Pay $14.5 Million for Illegal Marketing of Drug Detrol, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.
(Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pfizer-pay-145-million-illegal-marketing-drug-detrol;
Justice Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST. (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-largest-health-carefraud-settlement-its-history; Wyeth PharmaceuticalsAgrees to Pay $490.9 Million for Marketing the
Prescription
Drug
Rapamune
for
Unapproved
Uses
(July
30,
2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wyeth-pharmaceuticals-agrees-pay-4909-million-marketing-prescriptiondrug-rapamune-unapproved; Manhattan U.S. Attorney Simultaneously Files Additional Healthcare
Fraud Claims Against Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. And Settles Lawsuit Against Bioscrip, Inc., In
Connection with a Multimillion-DollarKickback Scheme Involving A PrescriptionDrug,U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST. (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/Januaryl4/NovartsBioScrip.php;
Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay More than $515 Million to Resolve Allegations of Illegal Drug Marketing
and
Pricing,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
JUST.
(Sept.
28,
2007),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/September/07 civ 782.html; GlaxoSmithKline to Plead
Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve FraudAllegations and Failure to Report Safety Data, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUST. (July 2, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billionresolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report; PharmaceuticalGiantAstraZeneca to Pay $520 Million for
Off-label
Drug
Marketing,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
JUST.
(Apr.
27,
2010),
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healthcare companies operating under Corporate Integrity Agreements
(CIAs) have later been found to be in violation of their CIAs. For
example, in United States ex rel. Matheny v. Medco Health Solutions,
Inc., 00 the Court of Appeals upheld a lower court decision to enforce a
CIA. The Defendants had signed a CIA in November 2004 with the
Department of Health and Human Services as part of the settlement of a
whistleblower lawsuit.10 1 Subsequently, the employees became aware in
2006 that Medco supervisors were concealing around $69 million
dollars in overpayments
that, under the CIA, should have been returned
10 2
government.
the
to
C. The FinancialIndustry
Although the Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are
relatively new in comparison to the False Claims Act, evidence suggests
that strong enforcement efforts by the SEC have had a positive impact
on deterring financial related fraud and shaping companies' behavior.
SEC enforcement actions, for example, have been found to result in
significant reductions in discretionary accruals over an extended period
of time.10 3 Because discretionary accruals correspond to the anticipated
liability a company expects it will have, smaller accruals indicate that
companies are engaging in less risky and potentially fraudulent
behavior. Furthermore, sustained, repeated enforcement activity by the
SEC has been effective at changing firms' behavior. 10 4 There is also
evidence that even a perceived increase in government enforcement
deters investors from illegally trading on material information. 105 In one
http ://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/pharmaceutical-giant-astrazeneca-pay-520-million-label-drug-marketing;
Aventis Pharmaceuticalto Pay U.S. $95.5 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST. (May 28, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/aventis-pharmaceutical-pay-us-955-million-settlefalse-claims-act-allegations; Amgen Inc. Pleads Guilty to FederalCharge in Brooklyn, NY.; Pays $762
Million to Resolve CriminalLiability and False Claims Act Allegations, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (Dec. 19,

2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/amgen-inc-pleads-guilty-federal-charge-brooklyn-ny-pays-762million-resolve-criminal; Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion .to Resolve Criminal & Civil Investigationsof
Off-label Promotion of Depakote,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
JUST.
(May
7,
2012),
http://www.j ustice.gov/opa/pr/abbott-labs-pay- 15-billion-resolve-criminal-civil-investigations-labelpromotion-depakote.
100. United States ex rel. Matheny v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 671 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir.
2012).
101. Id. at 1220.
102. Id. Other examples of cases involving violations of CIAs include United States ex rel.
McCarthy v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (D. Haw. 2001); United States v.
Chattanooga-Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 958 F. Supp. 2d 846, 864-65 (E.D. Tenn. 2013).
103. Jared Jennings et al., The Deterrent Effects of SEC Enforcement and Class Action Litigation
24, 31 (2011), http://ssm.com/abstract-1 868578.
104. Id.
105. Diane Del Guercio et al., The Deterrence Effect of SEC Enforcement Intensity on Illegal
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study of SEC enforcement activity from 1981 to 2011, the authors found
a strong statistical correlation between the intensity of enforcement and
decreases in insider trading, demonstrating a deterrent effect on the
industry. 106 The authors also compared their results to a previous study
that used the same methodology to analyze SEC enforcement activities
in the 1980s. 10 7 By comparing the two studies, the authors found that
returns from insider trading had decreased on average, suggesting that
over time the SEC's enforcement
activities resulted in an overall
10 8
decrease in insider trading.
The role whistleblowers have played in revealing misconduct
demonstrates their critical role in both delivering effective fraud
prosecutions and deterring others from similar actions. Under the False
Claims Act, whistleblowers have returned over $40 billion to taxpayers
since 1986 and played significant roles in reigning in the defense
industry, bringing to the Government's attention new types of
pharmaceutical fraud, and assisting with uncovering notorious secretive
financial fraud schemes. All of this has happened at the same time as
increased compliance efforts by companies. As former Assistant
Attorney General Stuart Delery stated, "[t]he period since the 1986
amendments to the FCA has seen a tremendous push by industries doing
business with the government to adopt effective compliance programs
and to prioritize corporate ethics."' °9 Contrary to the compliance
industry's fears, giving whistleblowers an active role in detecting and
prosecuting fraud appears to have invigorated corporate compliance
efforts and inspired greater attempts from businesses to deter fraud

investigations and prosecution.
V. WHISTLEBLOWERS AND COMPLIANCE EFFORTS COMPLEMENT

EACH OTHER

One way to compare the impact of whistleblowers with that of
internal compliance programs is to contrast the number of False Claims
Act cases with cases of corporate self-reporting. In the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce Institute for Legal Reform's 2014 proposal to overhaul the
False Claims Act, the Chamber argued that "[b]usinesses are best placed
Insider Trading 15 (2013), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1784528.
106. Id. at41-42.
107. Id.
108. Id. The False Claims Act whistleblower provisions have also been deployed effectively
against financial fraud. See, e.g., Press Release, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.5 Billion From
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015, U.S. Dep't Just. (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-35-billion-false-claims-act-casesfiscal-year-2015.
109. Delery, supranote 91.
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to detect and prevent wrongdoing . . . the statute should incentivize

companies to take the lead in curbing and reporting fraud." 110 The
Chamber reasoned that whistleblower claims result in "post hoc
enforcement" that is "imbalanced and ineffective," and proposes that
reforms favoring internal compliance will "incentivize businesses... to
prevent, identify, and disclose wrongdoing . . .generating significant

savings to taxpayers though less expensive but more effective
'
Businesses with
government investigations, and less litigation."111
be rewarded
should
compliance programs, according to this argument,
for their efforts, which are more efficient and a better use of resources
than Government investigations and litigation prompted by
whistleblowers.
But there are a number of self-reporting programs, and these have
been traditionally underutilized. For example, the False Claims Act
contains a little-used self-reporting provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).
That section provides that a person or entity that self-reports and
cooperates with the investigation in compliance with the provision will
be subject to a maximum of double, rather than treble damages. The
Affordable Care Act also established a self-disclosure for violators of
12
the Stark Law, which can form the basis of a False Claims Act case.'
The HHS OIG also has a protocol for self-disclosure of fraud by
healthcare providers. 11 3 Corporations thus already have numerous
incentives to ensure that they have strong compliance programs so that
they can use self-disclosure protocols. Self-disclosure of potential
violations helps companies avoid other potential consequences such as
being subject to a Corporate Integrity Agreement, or performing other
remediation. 114 The HHS OIG's Self-Disclosure Protocol states that
110. See, e.g., David W. Ogden & Jonathan G. Cedarbaum, Ideasfor Reforming the False Claims
2014),
20,
(Mar.
COUNSEL.COM
CORP.
Act,
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared-Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/corporate
-counsel-cedarbaum-ogden-fca.pdf (proposing lessened damages for entities that have a "certified
compliance program" and self-disclose); U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, FIXING
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT:

THE CASE

FOR COMPLIANCE-FOCUSED

REFORMS

2 (Oct.

2013),

http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/l/FixingTheFCAPagesWeb.pdf.
111. Id. at 8-9.
112. The Stark Statute prohibits physicians from making referrals for certain government funded
health care services to health care entities in which the physicians have a financial interest and prohibits
the health care entities from billing the Government for such services. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn. Section
6409 of the Affordable Care Act provides a self-disclosure protocol for violation or potential violations
of the Stark Statute. Pub. L. No. 11 1-148m 124 Stat. 119, 772 (2010).
113. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UPDATED
PROVIDER SELF-DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL (Apr. 17, 2013), http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/self-disclosure-

info/files/Provider-Self-Disclosure-Protocol.pdf.
114. See, e.g., Our Lady of Lourdes Memorial Hospital Has Paid More Than $3.37 Million to
Resolve Self-disclosed Billing Improprieties, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/pr/our-lady-lourdes-memorial-hospital-has-paid-more-337-million-
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good-faith disclosures and cooperation "are typically indications of a
robust and effective compliance program" which results in a
presumption against Corporate Integrity Agreements.' 15 Self-disclosing
entities are also subject to a minimum damages multiplier of 1.5 (as
opposed to 3), and may not be subject to the 60-day rule for returning
overpayments to Medicare and Medicaid.' 1 6 Thus, businesses can
reduce their damages greatly and escape costly and burdensome
integrity agreements and other oversight through self-disclosure.
Despite these reasons for businesses to self-report, self-disclosure is
still a rare event. Between 2008 and 2013, the HHS OIG resolved 235
cases through the self-disclosure process. In comparison, between 2008
and 2013, whistleblowers filed 2,225 cases where the Department of
Health and Human Services was the primary client. 117 Even crediting an
assumption that many of these cases lacked merit, this still leaves a
significant gap between the amounts of fraud brought to light by selfdisclosure and those brought to light by whistleblowers. Greater
corporate incentives to self-disclose in recent years do not appear to
have caused a decrease in whistleblower cases, and self-disclosure
remains a minority of fraud cases. Indeed, lack of success of voluntary
disclosure was one incentive for the adoption of mandatory disclosure
provisions for certain categories of violations of law by defense
contractors. 118 Given the apparent disuse of these provisions, the
argument that greater emphasis on self-disclosure to reduce and deter
fraud will achieve better compliance than whistleblower programs that
have recovered billions of dollars for taxpayers appears overstated. 19
In addition to existing incentives for businesses to self-report, it
seems unlikely that more leniency is necessary to encourage compliance
efforts, given that the potential threat of whistleblower suits is a great
motivator to create effective compliance programs. This is what
occurred with the defense industry in the wake of the 1986 False Claims
Act amendments and has more recently occurred after the Dodd-Frank
resolve-self-disclosed; see also United States ex rel. Grant v. Rush-Presbyterian/St. Luke's Med. Ctr.,

No. 99 C 06313, 2001 WL 40807, at *6 (N.D. III. Jan. 16, 2001).
115. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OIG's PROVIDER SELF-

DISCLOSURE PROTOCOL SERVICES OFFICE 2 (Apr. 17, 2013), http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/selfdisclosure-info/files/Provider-Self-Disclosure-Protocol.pdf
116. Id.
117. Fraud Statistics-Overview, U.S.
DEP'T
OF
JUST.
(Dec.
23,
2013),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civiU/legacy/2013/12/26/C-FRAUDS-FCA-Statistics.pdf
118. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.203-13.
119. The Department of Justice estimates that since inception of the new False Claims Act in
1986, whistleblowers have recovered over $30 billion. Justice Department Celebrates 25th Anniversary
of False Claims Act Amendments of 1986, DEP'T OF JUST. (Jan. 31, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-celebrates-25th-anniversary-false-claims-actamendments- 1986.
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whistleblower provisions passed. Truly effective programs that are
viable options for employees to use without fear of retaliation and are
not window-dressing
can compete effectively with whistleblower
0
programs.12
Requiring whistleblowers to report internally before reporting to the
Government would actually risk less compliance. Companies could use
the opportunity not to correct the problem and self-report, but rather to
circle the wagons and avoid government scrutiny. 121 Instead of working
with regulators and whistleblowers to remedy the fraud, retaliation
against the whistleblower is the more likely outcome. Indeed, there is a
growing trend of defendants suing whistleblowers for allegedly taking
documents, disclosing and stealing trade secrets, and' violating
nondisclosure agreements in the course of bringing the fraud to a
regulator's attention. 122 In the securities context, companies have
attempted to use their employee contracts and nondisclosure agreements
to prevent employees from reporting fraud. In response, the SEC

recently stepped up efforts to review companies' agreements with123
their
employees and expressed concern about these types of agreements.
VI. CONCLUSION

Ultimately, there is little evidence that compliance programs are
superior at preventing and deterring fraud such that they should be
prioritized at the expense of whistleblower programs. Whistleblower
programs have proven valuable at rooting out and deterring fraud and
have resulted in the recovery of billions of taxpayer dollars. In contrast,
there is little evidence that internal compliance programs are as effective
120. See, e.g., Daryl M. Shaprio & Stephen L. Markus, Protecting Corporate Compliance
Programs from SEC Whistleblower Incentive Payments, Client Alert, PILLSBURY WINTHRUP SHAW
PIThMAN
LLP
(May
25,
2011)
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/EnergyFinanceClientAertDoddFrankWhistleblow
er052511_fmal.pdf ("[W]here there is a perceived distrust of corporate policies and an absence of
effective alternative paths, employees will regard the SEC as the best option in the first instance.").
121. See Krawiec, supra note 6 (arguing that internal compliance structures do not deter
prohibited conduct within firms and may largely serve a window dressing function leading to underdeterrence and proliferation of costly but arguably ineffective compliance structures).
122. Charles A. Sullivan, Suing Whistleblowers, Health Reform Watch, SETON HALL L. SCH. (Feb.
20, 2015), http://www.healthreformwatch.com/2015/02/20/suing-whistleblowers/ (discussing the trend
of suing whistleblowers). Congress recently responded by adopting a provision that provides a person
immunity from suit under trade secret laws if the person provided the information to an attorney or the
government for the purpose of reporting violations of law. See Defend Trade Secrets Law of
2016, Pub.L.No. 114-153, §7, 130 Stat. 153, 384.
123. Rachel Louise Ensign, SEC Probes Companies' Treatment of Whistleblowers: Agency
Officials ConcernedAbout Corporate Backlash Against Whistleblowers, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2015,
9:00
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-probes-companies-treatment-of-whistleblowers1424916002.
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at deterring or remedying fraud. Unless whistleblowers have the
alternative option of taking their complaints directly to the Government,
much of their information may not see the light of day and actual
compliance will be undermined. Whistleblower programs provide
accountability and lead to actual compliance. Neither whistleblowers
nor compliance efforts work at cross-purposes. Rather, they can, and
do, work in synergy for the ultimate goal of remedying fraud and
deterring future such conduct.
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